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To provide personalized services and remain 
competitive, many online companies depend on 
individual disclosure of personal information. An 
emerging common theme, in the quest for privacy 
solutions, is the idea to empower individuals to control 
the management of their personal information. This 
study proposes a third-option design that seeks to 
empower users when signing up for an online service. 
We also measure individual privacy empowerment in 
a 2*2 experimental design study (reward/utility-limit 
mechanism to high/low sensitivity information 
context) using the proposed third-option design. 
Results from the multigroup analysis indicate that 
respondents prefer a reward mechanism over a utility-
limit mechanism when asked to disclose less sensitive 
data. However, the utility-limit mechanism is 
preferred in the highly sensitive group indicating that 
a simple linear relationship does not exist between 
monetary rewards and information sensitivity. 
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. 
1. Introduction  
Touted as the currency of the information 
economy, data has become an increasingly valuable 
commodity in the big data era. To provide 
personalized services and remain competitive, many 
online companies depend on the individual disclosure 
of personal information. Companies often rely on self-
disclosure mechanisms like site registrations and opt-
in forms to collect demographic and other types of 
personal data. However, self-disclosure is a misnomer 
as a lot of companies have developed sophisticated 
monitoring systems and data mining tools to discreetly 
gather personal information without individual 
consent. Companies have been found to use 
clickstream tools, cookies and tracking software to 
unobtrusively collect individual private data. This 
apparent lack of transparency behind data collection 
and mining practices constitutes an abuse of individual 
privacy rights.    
Since the dawn of the Internet, information 
privacy has progressively become an important issue 
to individuals, companies, policy advocates and 
government regulatory bodies. The primary objective 
of privacy researchers and regulatory bodies is to 
develop the perfect blend of privacy tools and legal 
frameworks to concurrently protect individual privacy 
rights and facilitate data collection. Over the years, 
several privacy tools have been developed and 
implemented to help protect online consumer privacy. 
One of such tools is the privacy seal program which 
has been developed to help consumers identify 
websites that follow a basic set of privacy rules. 
Similar tools, TRUSTe and P3P, also provide seals to 
websites that follow strict privacy policies set by the 
Online Privacy Alliance (OPA). These tools provide 
assurances to customers that websites with seals abide 
by codes of online information practices and promote 
fair information collection. However, their impact in 
curbing online data abuse have been abysmal due to 
their lack of uniformity. Also, it has not been 
practically feasible for these seal programs to monitor 
all the websites on the internet and as such, consumers 
who choose to use only seal approved websites will be 
limited to a much restricted number of websites to 
access. 
Over the years, researchers and privacy advocates 
have continued the debate and search for practical yet 
effective solutions to information privacy rights abuse. 
An emerging common theme, in the quest for privacy 
solutions, is the idea to empower individuals to control 
the management of their personal information. 
Consumer empowerment is attained by providing 
customers the privacy control options and rights to 
control the nature and content of data collected about 
them. Recent studies have defined and operationalized 
individual privacy empowerment [1-2].  These studies 
have also identified several dimensions that seek to 
measure individual privacy empowerment and further 
evaluated the impact it has on other privacy constructs 
like trust and privacy concern [1]. To comprehend and  





Table 1- Definitions of Terms 
 
advocate for individual privacy empowerment, we 
argue the need for continuous in-depth experimental 
studies to analyze the trade-offs between information 
disclosure, compensation and data control. Adopting 
previously defined dimensions, we intend to measure 
individual privacy empowerment in a 2*2 
experimental design study (reward/utility-limit 
mechanism to high/low sensitivity information 
context) using a third-option online sign-up design.  
The use of the reward and utility-limit mechanism is 
based on previous studies which have found 
compensation rewards as a primary influencer of 
information disclosure[3-4].  
       The purpose of this study is to determine the 
impact of rewards and utility-limit on individual 
privacy empowerment in an information sensitivity 
context when signing up for an online service. In the 
next section, we discuss the underpinning theories of 
this study, proceeded by the conceptual framework 
and research design. The other half of the paper is 
devoted to the discussion of results and contribution of 
the study to both literature and practice.  
2. Information Sensitivity and Disclosure 
Information sensitivity is the level of privacy 





information in a specific situation [5]. Request for 
highly sensitive information has been found to be 
positively correlated with privacy concern. This is 
because people perceive disclosure of sensitive 
information to be riskier than non-sensitive 
information [6]. Several psychological theories have 
been adapted to explain how individual behavior 
influences information disclosure. One of such 
theories is the theory of procedural justice which 
posits that individuals are more likely to disclose 
personal data for organizational use when they 
perceive that fair procedures have been implemented 
to protect their individual privacy. Also, the social 
response theory asserts that an individual will 
voluntarily disclose their personal information in 
response to a similar disclosure from another 
individual or organization. The theory further 
describes the need for companies to build reciprocal 
relationships with their customers to enhance 
voluntary information disclosure. Li suggests that 
companies can start with the exchange of less sensitive 
data and subsequently, increase the level of sensitivity 
depending on the intimacy of the relationship [7]. The 
reciprocity theory, much similar to the social response 
theory, also explains “the willingness of individuals to 
match the level of intimacy in the disclosure they 
return with the level of intimacy in the disclosure they 
receive”[8]. Individuals often desire to exhibit fairness 
in their transactions with third-parties but also will not 
hesitate to retaliate or reward third-party behavior 
when considered appropriate [9]. For instance, 
Terms and Dimensions Definition 
Third-option design a sign-up template where users are provided with a partial consent option regarding the sale of the personal data to 
third parties 
Information sensitivity  the level of privacy concern an individual show when asked to disclose information in a specific situation 
Reward/utility-limit 
mechanism 
for full consent-  the reward mechanism promises participants a one-time $20 gift card while the utility-limit 
mechanism only grants them full access to the online service 
for partial consent (declining the collection and use of secondary data)-  the reward mechanism provides full access 
to the service but no gift card while the utility-limit mechanism provides access to a limited functional version of 
the online service 
Privacy Empowerment providing consumers with the privacy control options and rights to control the nature and content of data collected 
about them 
Informativity the provision of transparent notices to consumers regarding the type of data being collected, reasons for the data 
collection and, how the data is being collected. 
Optionality the provision of privacy options and tools to individuals to manage the use, access and distribution of their 
personal information 
Controllability the extent to which individuals are satisfied with the consequences of their privacy decisions 
Page 4624
interviewers are likely to receive more responses from 
surveys with attached monetary rewards than from 
surveys with no attached monetary rewards. Also, 
websites that request for registration (demographic 
data) even before providing any service are less likely 
to receive much data and even if they do, may receive 
falsified and inaccurate data.  
The privacy calculus theory asserts that an 
individual’s intention to disclose personal information 
is dependent on some form of risk-benefit analysis. 
According to the risk-benefit or utility theory, 
information disclosure is primarily influenced by 
monetary reward [10]. Culnan and Armstrong found 
that individuals expect economic value or benefits at 
the expense of surrendering control of their personal 
data [11]. Further, recent studies show that users are 
often willing to trade off their privacy for both 
financial and non-financial rewards [12,4,6]. 
Empirical evidence from these studies reveal that 
consumers are more likely to accept cash 
considerations or free complete software package 
benefits in exchange for their information. 
Interestingly, a couple of researchers and policy 
analysts have raised issues that involve treating 
consumer data as labor worthy of compensation [13]. 
The debate seems to have shifted from privacy 
awareness to user compensation for data. Research 
shows that online consumers have been denied the 
opportunity to share in the wealth created by their 
personal data which is valued around 156 billion 
dollars annually [14].  To achieve individual privacy 
empowerment, we argue the need for continuous in-
depth experimental studies to analyze the trade-offs 
between information disclosure, compensation and 
data control.  
 
3. Privacy Empowerment 
To empower is to grant an individual the power, 
right or authority to perform various acts or duties 
[15]. The central theme of empowerment is the 
delegation of control. Alshibly and Chiong  asserts that 
empowerment is related to control while Hoffman et 
al. defines consumer empowerment as “shifting the 
balance of power from service providers, who have 
traditionally held power, to the consumers who have 
traditionally been powerless” [16, 17]. Consumer 
empowerment is attained by providing customers the 
privacy control options and rights to control the nature 
and content of data collected about them. Van Dyke et 
al. identified three dimensions: notice, choice and 
access which sought to measure individual privacy 
empowerment in an e-commerce context [1]. 
Frimpong and Sun further incorporated privacy design 
principles and redefined these dimensions (notice as 
informativity, choice as optionality and access as 
controllability) to measure individual privacy 
empowerment in an information sensitivity context 
[2].  
Hoepman argues that “the natural starting point to 
derive privacy preserving strategies is to look at when 
and how privacy is violated, and then consider how 
these violations can be prevented” [18]. Research 
shows that privacy violations often occur during 
software installation processes and online service 
sign-ups [19-21]. In line with Hoepman’s argument 
and previous literature, we illustrate (using a sign-up 
template in figure 1) how privacy design tools and 
behavioral theories can be adopted and implemented 
to empower individuals against online privacy 
violations. The rationale behind the use of an online 
sign-up template is to demonstrate how individuals 
can be empowered to act autonomously and control 
Figure 1. The third-option design  
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the use and sharing of their data in a single consent 
decision.  In the proceeding section, we illustrate the 
proposed sign-up process (third-option design) of an 
online service under the framework of privacy 
empowerment dimensions: informativity, optionality 
and controllability.     
                       
3.1 Informativity  
       Companies spell out the kind of information they 
are going to collect from users in privacy notices and 
end-user license agreements (EULA’s). These privacy 
notices and EULA’s outline the contractual 
obligations and rights between the service provider 
and individual user. However, multiple surveys and 
research reveal that most people have limited 
understanding of privacy notices and even if they do, 
possess little to no desire to read such lengthy notices 
[19-21].  Research shows that these notices are written 
“by lawyers for lawyers” due to the complexity of the 
legal jargons and length of clauses which severely 
limit user’s ability to understand and make informed 
decisions [19-21]. For instance, a software provider 
included a $1,000 cash prize offer in the company’s 
privacy statement which was displayed during the 
installation process. Interestingly, the prize was only 
claimed after the software had been installed over 
3,000 times in 4 months [22]. This provides evidence 
that most people simply ignore these privacy notices 
and as such have no idea what they consent to when 
they choose to use the provided service. Privacy 
notices therefore becomes a conduit for online 
companies and service providers to violate individual 
privacy rights.   
      Informativity is the most essential principle and 
first step in the process of empowering users to take 
control of their data management.  This dimension 
provides guidelines to ensure transparency in the data- 
collection process. It states that companies need to 
ensure that their privacy documents are worded with 
everyday simple language and provides answers to 
questions like how, why and what information are  
expected to be collected from individuals. Companies 
need to ensure they adopt interactive privacy designs 
that make it easier for individuals to read and 
understand privacy notices in a shorter time frame. 
These should enable users make rational privacy 
decisions that reflect their level of privacy sensitivity 
and concern. This presents a win-win situation for both 
firms and most particularly, consumers since privacy 
policies are clearly communicated and as such are able 
to make properly informed decisions. Users can then 
make informed decisions whether to sign-up for or 
decline the use of online services.  
        As such we hypothesize that the use of a 
simplified privacy notice in the third-option design has 
a significant effect on informativity. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The third-option design has a significant 
effect on informativity. 
3.2  Optionality 
     Easy interpretation and comprehension of privacy 
notices do not necessarily lead to informed decisions 
if users are being limited to two forced options in 
existing mandated disclosure forms. In a sense, this 
design flaw negates all the advancements that have 
been made to try and make it easier for users to read 
and understand such complex privacy notices. 
Individuals are expected to make informed decisions 
as to which software packages and online services to 
use based on their privacy concerns [23]. However, 
current EULA and privacy notices employ a forced 
consent design where individuals are provided with 
only two options when signing up for an online service 
or downloading a software package. The mandatory 
disclosure design presents the user with “Yes, I agree” 
and “No, I do not agree” options and as such do not 
offer any motivation for users to read or pay attention 
to the EULA and privacy notices [19]. Even when 
motivated, privacy conscious users who are most 
likely to pay attention or read such notices are unable 
to do so. According to the privacy calculus theory, 
individuals often compare the utility benefits of the 
online service to the possible negative consequences 
of signing up for online services. Therefore, they are 
most likely to sign up for such services if the positives 
outweigh the negatives, a situation which most often 
is the case. In the situation where users might not agree 
with the privacy notice or remain uncomfortable with 
the monitoring and data collection practices of the 
company, the only option available to such users is to 
decline the terms of the privacy notices which means 
they cannot use said software or online service.  
     After informativity, there is the need to provide 
users the options and means to control the use of their 
personal information after they have been informed of 
the data collection activity. In this instance, the 
optionality dimension posits that individuals should be 
able to control the collection and use of secondary data 
(data not required for the primary function of the 
service but more so for marketing and third-party 
sharing purposes). We argue that sign-up templates 
ought to be designed to allow users decide the type and 
sensitivity level of data they are willing to share. For 
instance, companies can then classify their data 
collection into two types: primary data (for registration 
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purposes and service functionality) and secondary data 
which is mostly for marketing and third-party sharing 
purposes. Users can then partially consent to either one 
or both of the requested data types depending on their 
privacy sensitivity level and still have access to the 
service. This represents a shift from ‘the one size fits 
all’ privacy approach where users have to consent to 
the entire privacy notice to have access to the service. 
Therefore, we postulate that the provision of a partial 
consent (a granular form of privacy consent) in the 
third-option design has a significant effect on 
optionality.   
Hypothesis 2: The third-option design has a significant 
effect on optionality. 
3.3  Controllability  
     Research findings also reveal that users are likely 
to trade off their information privacy for monetary 
rewards or full product features [12,4,6]. Therefore, 
users who clearly agree that their information should 
be collected and shared should receive some form of 
compensation or perhaps a share of the economic 
value generated from their data [9]. Arguments have 
been advanced that such compensation framework 
ought to be designed and introduced in privacy notices 
[13]. As previously stated, current privacy notices are 
regulated by the mandated disclosure law which offers 
only two options and as such users can only decline or                         
agree to privacy notices.  This forced consent design 
do not offer any motivation for users to read or pay 
attention to the EULA and privacy notices since there 
is no real incentive in doing so [24]. To achieve 
individual privacy empowerment, there is the need to 
design a new sign-up template that introduces “a trade-
off option” in the sign up process providing users the 
option to decide if they want companies to collect 
secondary information and if so, their deserving 
compensation. We argue that this mechanism should 
not be an afterthought but rather a default privacy 
principle embedded in the sign-up process.  
     The controllability dimension describes the extent 
to which individuals feel satisfied with the outcomes 
of their privacy decisions. People are well positioned 
to make informed choices when they are properly 
informed and provided with suitable privacy control 
tools, and as such more likely to be satisfied with the 
outcome of their choices. Companies need to adopt 
privacy designs that ensure high informativity and 
optionality to provide consumers the sense of control 
they desire to feel empowered. The third-option design 
is guided by two design principles based on the theory 
of reciprocity and rational choice. The first principle 
assumes that individuals will prefer a reward 
mechanism when asked to disclose less sensitive 
information. Also, the second principle asserts that 
individuals will prefer a utility-limit mechanism when 
asked to disclose highly sensitive information. We 
elaborate more on both mechanisms in the next 
section. Overall, we argue that the proposed design 
mechanism should have significant impact on 
controllability together with informativity and 
optionality.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The third-option design have a 
significant effect on controllability.  
4. Methodology 
4.1  Research Design 
     An experimental survey was conducted to measure 
privacy empowerment using a 2x2 factorial design 
where two levels of information sensitivity were 
paired with a reward and utility-limit mechanism. To 
ensure novelty and practicality, respondents were 
provided the context of signing-up for a hypothetical 
online dating service (LetsHang.com). A survey tool 
was designed to imitate the sign-up template described 
in the previous section. Four different versions of the 
tool were developed to reflect the 4 dimensions in 
Figure 2 below.  
     Survey tool 1 and 2 both included low sensitive 
information, however, both tools were assigned 
different mechanisms (reward or utility-limit). The 
same procedure was repeated for survey tool 3 and 4 
using highly sensitive information. The reward 
mechanism promised participants a one-time $20 gift 
card for full consent while the utility-limit mechanism 
only granted them full access to the online service. For 
partial consent (declining the collection and use of 
secondary data), the reward mechanism provided full 
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access to the service but no gift card while the utility-
limit mechanism provided access to a limited 
functional version of the online service.  An initial 
pilot study was conducted among a section of graduate 
students to check for measurement errors. After which, 
corrected versions of the survey tools were made 
available online to the respondents.   
The sample was divided into two groups: high and 
low sensitivity context. To achieve our research 
objectives, a within-subject experimental design was 
used to measure perceived privacy empowerment 
under two treatment mechanisms: reward and utility-
limit. Respondents in both groups (high and low 
sensitivity) were exposed to the two treatment 
mechanisms (reward and utility-limit). The within-
subject design is appropriate for relatively small 
sample sizes and also ensures that, individual 
differences do not distort the results since each 
respondent serve as his/her own baseline.  
4.2  Sample and Measures 
     This study adopted a quantitative online survey-
based approach with a sample of 73 respondents. 
Survey respondents were randomly sampled from the 
student population at a large university in Texas. There 
were 146 usable responses (due to the within-subject 
experimental design) and no reported missing data in 
the dataset. The sample comprised 34 males (46%) and 
39 females (54%).  More than half of the respondents 
(63%) were found to be between ages 18 to 24 while 
17% fell between ages 25 to 29. The measurement 
scale for the three dimensions in the privacy 
empowerment construct was developed based on an 
extensive literature review [1,2,25]. Each of the three 
dimensions (informativity, optionality and 
controllability) contained three items each. All items 
were assessed using a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ with the 
exception of demographic questions (age, gender).  
5. Results  
      The model was estimated using Smart PLS 
statistical software due to the presence of both 
reflective and formative scales. We assessed the 
reliability and validity of the construct measures to 
ensure that the constructs were accurately measured 
and represented.  
 
    
Figure 3. Estimated Model  




















1.000  0.875 0.879 
HTMT   0.145                               0.127 













SRMR 0.029 0.029 
d_ULS 0.047 0.047 
d_G 0.110 0.110 
Chi-Square 93.778 93.778 
rms Theta 0.233  
NFI 0.930 0.930 
   The figures shown in Tables 2,3 and 4 are estimated 
using the Smart PLS software. As the estimated model 
in Figure 3 shows, the factor loadings of reflective 
constructs (i.e., Optionality and Controllability) were 
pretty high (above 0.9), supporting reliability and 
convergent validity. Meanwhile, the formative 
construct of Informativity comprised three 
components that exhibited different weights. In 
addition, we checked for the model’s predictive 
accuracy by assessing the coefficient of determination. 
The R2 for the two endogenous constructs, optionality 
(0.763) and controllability (0.813), signaled that the 
model explained the majority of their variance. in 
particular, over 80% of the variance in controllability 
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was explained. All the fit indexes were satisfactorily 
within the accepted thresholds (Appendix -table 3). 
   With the confidence in the model, we conducted a 
multigroup analysis to determine the effect of the 
mechanisms (rewards and utility-limit) on individual 
privacy empowerment among the two groups (high 
and low sensitivity). From Table 4, we found that the 
design has a significant effect on informativity in both 
groups indicating support for hypothesis 1. For 
hypothesis 2, the design has a significant effect on 
optionality in the low sensitivity group but not in the 
high sensitivity group. This implies that hypothesis 2 
is confirmed in the low sensitivity group but not in the 
high sensitivity group. Further, we found that 
hypothesis 3 was only supported in the high sensitivity 
group. 
Table 4. Multi-group Analysis 
















0.586 0.000 -0.712 0.000 
Design -> 
Optionality 
0.156 0.020 -0.094 0.115 
Design -> 
Controllability 
0.072 0.202 -0.124 0.032 
      Also, the results in Table 4 provide support for the 
previously discussed design principles. The 
multigroup analysis indicates that the low sensitivity 
group preferred the reward mechanism to feel 
empowered. The high sensitivity group rather 
preferred the utility-limit mechanism to feel 
empowered. For the low sensitivity group, the third-
option design has significant effect on both 
informativity and optionality but not controllability. 
This means that participants in the low sensitivity 
group depend on optionality to act as a full mediator 
to feel empowered. However, this is not the case in the 
high sensitivity group as optionality is not significant 
as a mediator.  
6. Discussions 
When requesting information from individuals, 
companies can enhance privacy empowerment by 
providing adequate notice of data collection and 
suitable privacy control options. Van Dyke et al.  
asserts “that the provision of adequate notice is 
empowering because it allows individuals to protect 
their own interests and make decisions based on 
informed consent” [1]. We found the use of a 
simplified privacy notice in the third-option design to 
be adequate enough to satisfy informativity so far as 
individuals were informed of the type of data to be 
collected, the data collection methods and the reasons 
for the data-collection. Moreover, simplifying the 
notice in the design made it easier for respondents to 
understand and process, thereby ensuring that 
subsequent individual disclosure decisions were based 
on a genuine informed consent. Further, the design had 
a significant effect on optionality indicating that 
respondents preferred the additional “third choice 
option”. Previous literature posits that perceived 
empowerment can be achieved through the flexibility 
in defining one’s data control choices and as such 
individuals ought to be provided with data control 
choices reflecting both primary use (needed to provide 
the service) and secondary uses such as marketing and 
third-party disclosure [1,25]. The third option design 
increases individuals’ flexibility since it allows them 
to control the primary and secondary use of their 
personal data in a single consent decision. The partial 
consent in the design allows individuals to consent to 
the primary use of their data for service 
personalization while forbidding any further 
secondary use which is in stark contrast to the existing 
mandated disclosure design.  The design also has 
significant effect on controllability and accounts for 
81% of the variation in controllability. Therefore, the 
respondents perceive that the design include fair and 
transparent procedures to protect their privacy. Other 
than justifying the procedural justice theory, the result 
also implies that respondents were strongly satisfied 
with their individual disclosure decisions. Previous 
research indicates that consumers attain privacy 
empowerment when they are satisfied with the 
outcomes resulting from their privacy decisions [2].     
Results from the multigroup analysis indicates 
that respondents prefer the reward mechanism over the 
utility-limit mechanism when asked to disclose less 
sensitive data. Individuals expect reciprocity in their 
relationship with companies and as such conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis to determine the fairness of any 
exchange they partake. In this instance, the 
respondents perceive the low sensitive data to be less 
risky and as such consider the $20 gift card to be a fair 
return for any potential disclosure cost. Therefore, we 
interpret that individuals are more likely to be satisfied 
with the outcome of their privacy decisions when 
companies attach monetary rewards when requesting 
low sensitive data. 
However, the utility-limit mechanism is preferred 
in the highly sensitive group indicating that a simple 
linear relationship does not exist between monetary 
rewards and information sensitivity. In this instance, 
respondents perceive the highly sensitive data to be 
very risky and as such do not consider the $20 gift as 
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a fair return in the exchange. However, they are rather 
satisfied with the utility-limit mechanism which offers 
full access to the dating service. Faja found that 
individual privacy concern increases when consumers 
are asked to disclose highly sensitive information for 
financial rewards than for other benefits [26]. We offer 
two possible explanations for this phenomenon. 
Respondents might have subjectively valued the full 
service access to be higher than the $20 gift card and 
therefore perceive the offer as a fair return for any 
potential disclosure risk. This rationale is supported by 
Hwansoo et al. who asserts that “individuals perceive 
monetary rewards as decoys and as such request for 
sensitive data increases their uneasiness and raises 
doubts about the motives behind monetary reward 
offers” [12]. Also, due to the fair and transparent 
procedures in the design, respondents might have felt 
more comfortable and less concerned exchanging their 
sensitive information for the service than the monetary 
reward. This action confirms the reciprocity theory’s 
assertion that individuals are likely to reciprocate 
appropriate behavior (fair procedures in the design) 
with a reward of their own. It should be noted that 
individual disclosure preferences are not objective 
measures of the attractiveness of both mechanisms but 
rather, the relative contributions of the mechanism to 
perceived privacy empowerment. 
      This study also offers practical suggestions to 
companies regarding consumer empowerment.  To 
empower consumers, companies should treat 
information disclosure as a “relationship” rather than 
a transaction. Hwansoo et al., postulates that highly 
sensitive information requests are often appropriate 
for loyal users who have had multiple transactions 
with the company signaling the existence of a “trusting 
relationship” [12]. Also, companies seeking to 
develop a trusting and transparent relationship with 
their customers regarding information disclosure 
should move away from mandated disclosure forms to 
a more simplified form of privacy notices with flexible 
options for privacy control. Previous research 
indicates that monetary rewards are more appropriate 
for low sensitive general information [12]. Therefore, 
information-collecting companies should design their 
reward mechanisms prudently as monetary rewards 
exhibit a negative influence on information privacy 
concerns specifically in a higher sensitivity context.  
7.  Conclusion 
The growth of big data analytics has coincided 
with the surge in data breaches and security threats. 
Consequently, individual privacy concerns have 
increased partly due to these security breaches and the 
abuse of privacy rights by data-hungry organizations. 
According to previous literature, privacy rights abuse 
can be prevented through privacy empowerment and if 
possible, eliminate all privacy concern issues. This 
study proposes a third-option design that seeks to 
empower users when signing up for an online service. 
We have found that companies can empower their 
consumers by adopting fair and transparent privacy 
policies. Subsequently, consumer empowerment 
should lead to a positive information disclosure 
behavior. Also, companies should offer a blend of 
monetary and non-monetary rewards in the 
appropriate data sensitivity contexts. To sum it up, 
privacy empowerment provides a possible win-win 
solution for both companies and their respective 
consumers and as such, companies are advised to 
proactively adopt privacy policies that embody this 
principle. 
      At this time, the respondents used for the study 
were from the academic community at a large 
university. This provides limitation on the extent to 
which the results can be generalized to the general 
population. However, plans are underway to conduct a 
second data-collection activity to expand the sample 
size and include working professionals in the study. 
We anticipate this to increase the sample size, validity 
and generalizability of the study. Also, this study 
focused only on privacy empowerment and did not 
consider its impact on other privacy constructs like the 
privacy paradox, trust and privacy concern. Further, 
future studies may consider possible legal policies and 
regulations which can enhance the adaptability and 
applicability of privacy control designs like the 
proposed third-option design in the study.  
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